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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VENUE FACTS: WHEN TO ALLEGE AND PROVE
A CAUSE OF ACTION
No person who is an inhabitant of this State shall be sued out of
the county in which he has his domicile....
T HE foregoing, which is taken from Texas Revised Civil
Statutes (Vernon, 1948), Article 1995, is the basic venue
rule in Texas. Because of the geographical expanse of the state,
the rule reflects the underlying policy of relieving defendants from
the necessity for traveling long distances in order to litigate their
suits. Such policy, as codified, affords the defendant the right to
be sued where it is usually most convenient for him to defend. This
right is invoked by entering a plea of privilege. For the plaintiff
to controvert the defendant's plea of privilege, there must be
proper allegation, notice, hearing and proof that the plaintiff's
cause of action falls within one or more of the exceptions to the
basic rule, which exceptions are shown as subdivisions under
Article 1995. It should be noted that there are numerous statutory
exceptions to the basic rule, but this Comment will be confined to
certain of those found under the main venue statute, Article 1995.
After defendant has properly filed his plea of privilege, he is
possessed of a prima facie right to have the case removed to
the county of his domicile. In order to overcome this right, and
to sustain venue where laid, plaintiff must show the court that
one of the statutory exceptions is applicable. Applicability de-
pends upon the existence of certain requisite "venue facts," which
plaintiff has the burden to establish.'
It has been said that in determining venue, there are two
elements or types of venue facts8 to be considered: (1) those
facts which are determined by looking to the petition; and (2)
those facts which must be proved by extrinsic evidence. Where
'Meredith v. McClendon, 130 Tex. 527, 111 S. W. 2d 1062 (1938).
2 Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Lowrie, 49 S. W. 2d 933, 936, 937 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) er. ref.




the nature of the suit is a venue fact, the petition is the best evi-
dence.4 Such petition need not be formally introduced in evidence,
for its contents will be judicially noticed.' All other venue facts
must be proved by outside evidence, the allegations in the petition
being of no help.6 Prior to Compton v. Elliott," prima facie proof'
of such other venue facts was sufficient to support a judgment
overruling a plea of privilege. It is now well settled that plaintiff
must prove the essential venue facts by a preponderance of the
evidence.' The defendant is allowed to offer contradictory evi-
dence1" but in some instances cannot offer evidence supporting
affirmative defenses." The venue facts which the plaintiff must
allege and prove by a preponderance are said to be those which
are found in the particular exception to the general venue statute
that is applicable to the type of claim alleged in the petition.'2
Thus, it would seem relatively simple for plaintiff to determine
what venue facts he must plead and prove, and for the most part
this is true. But there have been added certain venue facts by
judicial construction;" in other cases the venue facts are not
obvious, and it is therefore necessary to resort to judicial decisions.
One of the most troublesome questions which has arisen in
regard to plaintiff's controverting affidavit is, When must the
plaintiff allege and prove a cause of action as one of his "venue
facts?" First, there seems to be some confusion as to when the
plaintiff must allege a cause of action in his controverting affidavit.
4Gilbert v. Gilbert, 145 Tex. 114, 195 S. W. 2d 936 (1946).
5Hill v. Hill, 205 S. W. 2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
6 World Co. v. Dow, 116 Tex. 146, 287 S. W. 241 (1926).
7126 Tex. 232, 88 S. W. 2d 91 (1935).
8 See Comment, 13 Tex. L. Rev. 215 (1935).
9 A. H. Belo Corp. v. Blanton, 133 Tex. 391, 129 S. W. 2d 619 (1939) ; Compton v.
Elliot, cited supra note 7.
10 Compton v. Elliott, supra note 7.
11 Compton v. Elliott, supra note 7; Continental Fire & Casualty Ins. Corp. v. Amer.
ican Mfg. Co. of Texas, 206 S. W. 2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
12 Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 186 S. W. 2d 69 (1945); Compton v. Elliott,
supra note 7.
13 Park v. Wood, 146 Tex. 62, 203 S. W. 2d 204 (1947) ; Stockyards Nat. Bank v.
Maples, 127 Tex. 633, 95 S. W. 2d 1300 (1936).
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Some authorities hold that plaintiff is required to plead his cause
of action only where the existence of a cause of action is a venue
fact.14 There is much to be said for this view, and Rule 86, Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that the controverting
affidavit must only include the "fact or facts relied upon to confer
venue," seems to support it. However, in Jefferies v. Dunklin,'5 the
court concluded that since the plaintiff's controverting plea failed
to state a cause of action, it also failed to set up the "fact or facts
relied upon to confer venue." As a result, the court found plain-
tiff's plea to be meaningless and a nullity. The venue hearing in
the Dunklin case involved a question of the defendant's resi-
dence, plaintiff contending that venue was laid in the county of
defendant's residence, while the defendant claimed residence
elsewhere; plaintiff in the principal case never attempted to sustain
venue under one of the exceptions to Article 1995. As a result, it
seems that the allegation of a cause of action in plaintiff's con-
troverting affidavit is a minimum venue fact whenever defendant
files a plea of privilege. In support of its holding, the court in
the Dunklin case cited one case"6 involving venue exceptions which
require proof of a cause of action as a venue fact. Obviously,
where a cause of action is a venue fact, there must be a cause of
action alleged in order properly to support the proof.
In Fair v. Mayfield Feed & Grain Co.,17 a case involving Sub-
division 5, which states that if a person has contracted in writing
to perform an obligation in a particular county, suit may be
brought either in such county or where the defendant has his
domicile, the Dunklin case was cited as dissolving the confusion
on the point. The court held that in light of the Dunklin and A. H.
Belo v. Blanton"s cases, the controverting affidavit must allege a
14 Stone v. Kerr, 62 S. W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Demmer v. Lampasas
Auto Co., 34 S. W. 2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
15 131 Tex. 289, 115 S. W. 2d 391 (1938).
16 Henderson Grain Co. v. Russ, 122 Tex. 620, 64 S. W. 2d 347 (1933).
17 203 S. W. 2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
18 133 Tex. 391, 398, 129 S. W. 2d 619, 623 (1939).
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cause of action. The opinion in the Fair case was based for the
most part upon Belo v. Blanton, and it is significant to note that the
Belo case involved Subdivision 29, which treats of libel or slander,
stating that suit shall be brought in the county in which the plain.
tiff resides or in the county of residence of defendants, or any of
them, at the election of the plaintiff. As to this exception, a cause
of action is a venue fact. In the Belo case it was said that "it was
necesary for the controverting plea to unmistakably allege that
the party who swore to such plea made the petition a part thereof,
and thereby swore to the essential facts embodied in the entire
petition." It is submitted that the Dunklin view is based upon cases
involving exceptions calling for a cause of action as a venue fact
and is therefore in error as applied to every controverting affidavit
However, in view of the fact that the Dunklin case is a supreme
court decision, a plaintiff should always allege a cause of action
in his controverting affidavit, it being a minimum venue fact for
all subdivisions of Article 1995.
When must the plaintiff prove a cause of action to overcome a
plea of privilege? The plaintiff must, of course, prove a cause of
action where the existence of a cause of action is a venue fact. In
all subdivisions of Article 1995 which include the words "cause of
action," there must be alleged and proved a cause of action. In
all these cases, a cause of action is a venue fact. However, as shall
be seen, judicial construction has made existence of a cause of
action a venue fact in some subdivisions wherein "cause of
action" is not mentioned. It would be well to note at this time
that where the existence of a cause of action is essential to support
venue, each element of the cause of action is a separate venue
fact which must be alleged and proved by a preponderance of
evidence. 9
When there are multiple defendants, Article 1995 has several
applicable exceptions, the foremost of which are Subdivisions 4---
stating that as to defendants in different counties, suit may be
19 Crawford v. Sanger, 160 S. W. 2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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brought in any county where one of the defendants resides-and
29a-stating that as to two or more defendants, suit may be main-
tained against all necessary parties in any county where such suit
may be lawfully maintainable as to any of the defendants. The
exception in Subdivision 4 requires plaintiff, in order to overcome
defendant's plea of privilege, to plead and prove a cause of action
against the resident defendant which must be the same claim
asserted against him in the petition.2" The earlier cases indicated
that plaintiff must prove a legally enforceable claim against both
the resident and nonresident defendant-at least prima facie2t -
but it is well settled today that plaintiff need not prove a cause
of action against the non-resident defendant.22 However, he must,
as always, allege a cause of action against all defendants. The
nature of the cause of action against both defendants must be the
same, and the plaintiff must allege a joint cause of action against
all defendants or a cause of action so intimately connected with
the cause of action against the non-resident that the two may be
joined under the rule intended to avoid multiplicity of suits.2"
Subdivision 4 says nothing of a cause of action in its text, but the
courts, by decision, have added that particular set of venue facts
to the exception,24 the reason being that joinder might otherwise
be had by fraud.
As for Subdivision 29a, it has been said that "nothing in 29a
adds any new venue facts to those normally sufficient under any
other subdivision.""5 This subdivision can only apply in conjunc-
tion with another venue exception. If plaintiff sustains venue
against one defendant under any of the other subdivisions of
Article 1995, then he has sustained venue as to all other defendants
who are necessary parties. Plaintiff must plead a cause of action
20 Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples, cited supra note 13.
21 Taylor v. Whitehead, 88 S. W. 2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
22 Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples, supra note 13.
23 Ramey & Mathis v. Page, 228 S. W. 2d 976 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Stockyards
Nat. Bank v. Maples, supra note 13.
24 Park v. Wood, cited supra note 13.
25 1 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE (1950) § 4.36, p. 413.
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against all defendants,2" and must prove a cause of action against
one of the defendants not urging the plea of privilege, but only
when the existence of a cause of action is a venue fact under the
subdivision sought to be applied."
Another exception which deals with multiple defendants is
found in Subdivision 29, noted ante. Thereunder, where there
are two defendants, in order to establish venue in the resident's
county as against a plea of privilege of a non-resident defendant,
the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that
a cause of action for lefamation has in fact accrued against the
defendant asserting his plea of privilege."2 It will be noted that
in Subdivision 4 plaintiff must prove a cause of action only against
the resident defendant and not the non-resident. The exception in
Subdivision 29, being mandatory, prevails over that in Subdivision
4. It therefore appears, although there is little authority on the
subject, that plaintiff is not relieved of proving the necessary venue
facts against the non-resident defendant when he alleges and
proves that the resident defendant comes within the exception
found in Subdivision 29.
There are other exceptions under Article 1995 wherein it is well
settled that the existence of a cause of action is a venue fact neces-
sitating proof by a preponderance of evidence. First, there are
the exceptions dealing with domestic corporations-Subdivision
23, whch states that suits may be brought in the county in which
the principal office is situated or the cause of action arose. Fur-
ther, as to foreign corporations, Subdivision 27 indicates that
foreign corporations may be sued in any county where the cause
of action or a part thereof accrued, or in any county where such
company may have an agency. These two exceptions offer the
plaintiff several alternatives29 from which to choose in order to
26 Jefferies v. Dunklin, cited supra note 15; 43 TEx. Jim., Venue, § 36, p. 752.
27 R. E. Cox Dry Goods Co. v. Kellog, 145 S. W. 2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
er. ref.
28 1 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE (1950) § 4.35, p. 412.
29 Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Monteith, 138 Tex. 216, 158 S. W. 2d 63 (1941);
Lakeside Irr. Co. v. Markham Irr. Co., 116 Tex. 65, 285 S. W. 593 (1926).
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sustain venue in the county of suit, each of which constitutes a
separate set of venue facts.80 The plaintiff must prove either that
a cause of action, or a part thereof, arose in the county of suit,
that defendant has an agent in that county, or that its principal
office lies therein-only the first alternative requiring the proving
of a cause of action as a venue fact." One alternative in both
sections requires proof of a cause of action,8 2 although it seems
that plaintiff need not establish the amount of damage. 8 Subdi-
vision 23 uses the expression, "cause of action or part thereof
arose," while in Subdivision 27 "cause of action or a part thereof
accrued" is used. "Accrued" and "arose" have been held to have
the same meaning and effect. 4 The Texas Supreme Court has said
that since "accrual of a cause of action" as employed in Sub-
division 29 had been construed to require a cause of action to
be alleged and proved, "then certainly the same meaning and
effect must be given to the similar phrase used in Subdivision 23,
'county in which the cause of action, or part thereof, arose'."
And in Belo v. Blanton86 the court said there was no distinction
and that this variation is without effect upon the necessity for and
manner of alleging and proving a cause of action. Thus, it is seen
that Subdvision 27 will be given the same construction as is given
Subdivision 23, and will require proof of a cause of action as a
venue fact under the proper alternative. 7 In addition, the plaintiff
must show that part of the cause of action arose or accrued in the
county of suit.88
The other exception wherein it is settled that proof of a cause
30 Rural Life Ins. Co. v. Caperton, 156 S. W. 2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. dism.
31 Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Monteith, cited supra note 29.
32 Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Monteith, cited supra note 29; Home Insurance Co.,
New York v. Barbee, 166 S. W. 2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; cf. Stripling v. Hoing,
203 S. W. 2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (only prima facie proof necessary).
33 Farmers' Seed and Gin Co. v. Brooks, 125 Tex. 234, 81 S. W. 2d 675 (1935)
84 Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Monteith, supra note 29.
35 Id. at 223, 158 S. W. 2d at 67.
36 Cited supra note 9.
37 1 McDONALD, TEXAs CIVIL PRACTICE (1950) § 4.30.
38 Newsom v. Continental Royalty Co., 209 S. W. 2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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of action is necessary to sustain venue is found in Subdivision 29,
which is a mandatory section. Under this subdivision one of the
venue facts is the existence of a cause of action for defamation,
9
and the plaintiff must allege in his affidavit the elements of a cause
of action for defamation and prove the same as in any ordinary
trial on the merits. 40
In addition to the above exceptions, there are several subdivi-
sions to Article 1995 under which the courts seem to require the
proving of a cause of action, although there is some confusion
among the decisions. In Subdivision 5, an excerpt from which
appears ante, it is settled that the existence of a cause of action
is not a venue fact,4' the plaintiff being required only to prove the
execution of a written contract by the defendant, or his authorized
agent.4" But Subdivisions 7 and 9 are not so clear. The former
states that in all cases of fraud and defalcation on the part of
public officers suit may be brought in the county where the fraud
or defalcation occurred. The cases uniformly hold that upon a
venue hearing, plaintiff must allege and prove by a preponderance
of the evidence either the necessary elements of actionable fraud
to the satisfaction of the trial court,4 or a cause of action for
fraud.44 The court in Eppenauer v. Schrup45 said: "It is a rule of
law in this state that when venue is sought to be acquired under
exception 7 of R.C.S., Art. 1995, practically all facts and circum-
stances must be proved necessary to recover in such action upon
s9 Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S. W. 2d 246 (1942) ; Rogers v.
Dickson, 157 S. W. 2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Note, 18 Tex. L. Rev. 111 (1939).
40 Blanton v. Garrett, 133 Tex. 399, 129 S. W. 2d 623 (1939) ; A. H. Belo Corp. v.
Blanton, cited supra note 9.
41 Petroleum Producers Co. v. Steffens, 139 Tex. 257, 162 S. W. 2d 698 (1942);
Wood Motor Co. v. Hawkins, 226 S. W. 2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). But c/. Chapman
v. First Nat. Bank of Wellington, 221 S. W. 2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
42 Petroleum Producers Co. v. Steffens, supra note 41; Pavlidis v. Bishop & Babcock
Sales Co., 41 S. W. 2d 294, 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
43 Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Shelton, 237 S. W. 2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
Reese v. Phillips, 233 S. W. 2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). But cf. Shaw Equipment Ca.
v. City-of Olney, 172 S. W. 2d 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
44Coalson v. Holmes, 111 Tex. 502, 240 S. W. 896 (1922).
45 121 S. W. 2d 473, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
19521
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
its merits; in other words, to establish that exception it inevitably
requires two trials of the issues involved when tried upon its
merits."
It would seem manifest, then, that a cause of action for fraud
must be proved under Subdivision 7,46 particularly when the
courts have held that to constitute actionable fraud, the plaintiff
must show damage as 'a result of his reliance on the representa-
tion.47 However, it has been held that it is not necessary for plain-
tiff to prove the exact amount of damages, since plaintiff is not
seeking a judgment for damages on trial of the plea of privilege;4"
the issue is rather, "Were the damages more than nominal?" 49
Subdivision 9, involving suits based on crime or trespass, states
that plaintiff may bring suit in the county where the crime, offense,
or trespass was committed. The cases construing this subdivision
require plaintiff to allege and prove each and every element of a
crime or trespass,5" but require only nominal damages to be shown,
it being necessary to show only that a legal right of plaintiff has
been violated. 1 The amount of damage is not relevant. The cause
of action is said to exist though damages are nominal.52 But in
Hurley v. Reynolds"5 it was said that matters relating to the
existence of a cause of action are irrelevant and not required
to be proved under Subdivision 9, since the issue is venue, not
liability. However, the very same case held that the plaintiff must
allege and prove all the elements of a trespass or crime, those
very elements creating the cause of action. In point of fact, it
would seem that a plaintiff must allege and prove a cause of action
46 Smith v. Abernathy, 6 S. W. 2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
47 Reese v. Phillips, cited supra note 43. But cf. Sterling Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Larson, 99 S. W. 2d 1013 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
48 Gomillion v. Lingold, 209 S. W. 2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
49 Reese v. Phillips, cited supra note 43.
50 Hurley v. Reynolds, 157 S. W. 2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; Walker v. Mar-
tin, 129 S. W. 2d 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
51 Maitland v. Santor, 216 S. W. 2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Hawkins v. Schroeter,
212 S. W. 2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
52 Hawkins v. Schroeter, supra note 51.
53 Cited supra note 50.
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on the venue hearing, not to create liability, but rather to sustain
venue.
In summary, it can be seen that under some of the subdivisions
of Article 1995, a plaintiff, in order to sustain venue, must, in all
practical respects, suffer two trials on the merits. The court in
Compton v. Elliot said that this was the price the plaintiff had to
pay to sustain venue in a county other than that of the defendant's
domicile.54 Matters would no doubt be facilitated if the plea of
privilege and the merits of the case were tried at the same time.
But, contrariwise, it seems that defendant is entitled to a separate
trial of his plea of privilege as a matter of law," except where he
requests a jury trial on the venue hearing, in which latter event
Rule 87 expressly authorizes a consolidated trial.
William C. Charlton.
54 Cited supra note 7.
55 Newlin v. Smith, 136 Tex. 260, 150 S. W. 2d 233 (1941). But cf. Pugh v. Childress
& Marshall, 207 S. W. 2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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